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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN), Apa
Mana, and Noah Flood (together, “Appellants”) appeal from an
Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, entered
August 15, 2018, by the honorable Judge Remus in the U.S.
District Court for New Union Island, No. 66-CV-2018. The district
court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2018), given the Complaint raises questions arising under federal
law and the Constitution. Appellants filed a timely Notice of
Appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4 (2016). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has valid jurisdiction over the
appeal based on 29 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Can Apa Mana bring an Alien Tort Statute (ATS or the “Statute”),
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018), claim against HexonGlobal, a domestic
corporation?
II. Is the Trail Smelter Principle a recognized principle of customary
international law enforceable as the “Law of Nations” under the
ATS?
III. Assuming the Trail Smelter Principle is customary international
law, does it impose obligations enforceable against nongovernmental actors?
IV. If otherwise enforceable, is the Trail Smelter Principle displaced
by the Clean Air Act?
V. Is there a cause of action against the United States Government,
based on the Fifth Amendment substantive due process protections
for life, liberty, and property, for failure to protect the global
atmospheric climate system due to the production, sale, and
burning of fossil fuels?
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VI. Do Plaintiffs’ law of nations claim under the Alien Tort Statute
and public trust claim under the Fifth Amendment present nonjusticiable political questions?

STATEMENT OF CASE
I. Factual Background
Over the past several decades, the interrelatedness between
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the changing climate system
has become evident. It is now nearly an uncontested fact among
the scientific community: “Evidence tells an unambiguous story:
the planet is warming, and over the last half century, this warming
has been driven primarily by human activity.” Jerry M. Melillo et
al., 2014: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE U.S.: THE THIRD
NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM 7 (May 2014) [hereinafter U.S.: THE THIRD NAT’L
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT]. Anthropogenic climate change presents
unmatched challenges for the global community, including
extreme weather events like droughts, flooding, and wildfires. U.N.
Env’t
Programme
and
World
Meteorological
Org.,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], IPCC
Synthesis Report, Climate Change 2014 (Summary for
Policymakers), at 8 [hereinafter IPCC Synthesis Report]. Avoiding
the catastrophic impacts of climate change requires sweeping and
concerted action from local, state, national, and international
governments to reduce GHG emissions.
HexonGlobal Corporation (HexonGlobal) is the surviving
corporation of the merger of all major U.S. oil producers. Record
(R.) at 5. HexonGlobal, through sales of its extracted fossil fuels,
has contributed substantially to global GHG emissions. Id. The
normal combustion of petroleum (a HexonGlobal fossil fuel) results
in the emission of considerable amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2).
Id. Information establishing the heat-retention properties of CO2
has been available since the nineteenth century. HexonGlobal does
not dispute that since the 1970s the corporation has been aware
that continued combustion of fossil fuels would result in harmful
global climate change, including sea level rise. Id. Nevertheless,
HexonGlobal continued to extract fossil fuels, which led to
injurious GHG emissions. Id.
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The United States is in a unique position. As the world’s
largest historical contributor of GHGs—responsible for twenty
percent of global cumulative emissions—the country plays a
critical role in the implementation of mitigation strategies. R. at
5–6. Despite the extensive research the federal government has
conducted indicating that the consequences of inaction are dire, the
U.S. has neglected its responsibility. In fact, for over a century, the
U.S. has promoted fossil fuel production through federal policies
including hundreds of billions in tax subsidies. R. at 6. Recently,
the U.S. has taken steps towards reducing its GHG emissions, and
has acknowledged the potential dangers of climate change. Id.; see
also U.S.: THE THIRD NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, at 7. While U.S.
efforts seemed promising and emissions began to decrease, efforts
were abandoned, and emissions lacked adequate control. R. at 7.
Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. is reversing its
commitments to safeguard the climate system. Id.
Appellant Apa Mana is an alien national of the island nation
of A’Na Atu. Appellant Noah Flood is a U.S. citizen and resident of
the New Union Islands, a U.S. possession. R. at 3. Both appellants
are members of the ODIN, a non-profit membership organization
devoted to protecting the interests of island nations threatened by
climate change. Id. Both A’Na Atu and New Union Islands are lowlying islands, with the populated areas of both islands lying below
one meter in elevation. R. at 4. A one-half to one-meter rise in sea
level from climate change would render the islands uninhabitable.
Id. Appellants bring the present claims to prevent this future harm
and seek damages for injuries already suffered. Mana asserts a
claim against HexonGlobal for violation of the law of nations under
the ATS, because appellee’s fossil fuel related emissions
significantly contribute to climate change and have caused
substantial damage to Mana’s community from the rising sea level.
R. at 3. Appellant Flood asserts a claim against the United States,
based on the government’s failure to protect the global climate
system held in public trust, and therefore subjecting Flood to loss
of life, liberty, and property in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. It is undisputed that limits on fossil
fuel production and combustion would reduce further damage to
Appellants’ properties from sea level rise, decrease health risks
associated with rising temperatures, and maintain the habitability
of the islands. R. at 5.
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2018, Appellants filed a complaint against HexonGlobal
and the United States of America in the U.S. District Court for
New Union Island. R. at 1. The Complaint asserted claims against
HexonGlobal under the Alien Tort Statute, and constitutional
claims against the United States for violations of public trust
obligations to protect the global climate system incorporated
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. R. at 1. On August 15, 2018, Judge Remus issued an
Opinion and Order dismissing Appellants’ Complaint. R. at. 11.
Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal, granted by this Court.
R. at 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant Apa Mana is entitled to bring a claim against
HexonGlobal, a domestic corporation, under the Alien Tort
Statute. The District Court for New Union Island incorrectly
concluded the Statute precludes corporate liability. R. at 8.
Traditional principles of statutory interpretation demand a finding
that permits domestic corporate liability. The plain language of the
ATS is unambiguous and the legislative history supports the
Statute’s clear language, which is at odds with corporate
immunity. Allowing corporations, such as HexonGlobal, to act
without consequences is illogical and antithetical to the Statute’s
purpose. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent holding in
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, excluded foreign corporate liability
because the Court expressed its concern of meddling in foreign
policy. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). That same concern is
inapplicable to Appellant’s claim invoking liability against
HexonGlobal.
The Trail Smelter Principle (the “Principle”) is a principle of
customary international law, which is enforceable as the law of
nations under the ATS. What constitutes a tort in violation of the
law of nations under the Statute remains unsettled, but it is
generally accepted that any claim based on customary
international law must be specific, universal, and obligatory, so as
to govern the behavior among States. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 714 (2004). The Principle imposes on every State an
obligation to refrain from acts in its sovereign territory that are
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contrary to the rights of other States or that would cause
transboundary harm. R. at 8; Trail Smelter Arbitration, (U.S. v.
Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (1941). This Principle has been
specifically reiterated by international sources and practiced by
nations across the world to such an extent establishing it as
customary international law enforceable as the law of nations.
Non-governmental
actors—including
HexonGlobal—are
obligated to comply with the Trail Smelter Principle. The Principle,
which is embodied in a U.S. treaty, carries with it the same force
as federal law. R. at 6; see United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107,
169. Thus, the same obligations are imposed on actors violating the
law. Further, while international law is typically carried on at a
higher level, administered by States and stipulated by their
representatives, the law of nations can nevertheless be enforced
against private, non-governmental actors. Specifically, when the
law of nations is violated under the ATS, the adjudicating court is
still able to impose liability on non-governmental actors in the
same way they do for other claims. While the tort committed under
the ATS is one in violation of the law of nations, the claim is before
a federal court and the available remedies are those originating in
federal law. International law also recognizes the individual
liability of non- governmental actors. The most authoritative
sources of international law specifically impose duties and
liabilities upon individuals as well as States. The Nurnberg Trial
1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int’l Mil. Trib. at Nuremberg 1946).
The Trail Smelter Principle is not displaced by the Clean Air
Act (CAA or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2018), because the two
are not in conflict. However, even if the Principle and the CAA do
conflict, the Principle is embodied in the Preamble of a ratified U.S.
treaty. UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169; R. at 6. Under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, ratified treaties and
federal law both operate as the supreme law of the land. U.S.
CONST. art. VI. Federal law may displace a treaty, and vice-versa,
depending on whichever is enacted most recent in time. Thus, the
Trail Smelter Principle, as embodied in a U.S. treaty, displaces the
CAA, which was enacted prior to ratification of the treaty.
The U.S. Government violated the Public Trust Doctrine by
failing to protect the global atmospheric climate system from
disruption. As a result, the government deprived appellant Flood
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of substantive due process protections of life, liberty, and property,
which he is entitled under the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine, as custodian to
its citizens, the U.S. serves as fiduciary and must protect the public
trust within its sovereign boundaries. The United States has had
knowledge of the dire consequences of increased GHG emissions on
climate change. R. at 6. Despite this knowledge, the U.S. not only
failed to adequately regulate emissions, but also supported the
fossil fuel industry through federal policies and tax subsidies. R. at
6. As a result, the U.S. breached its fiduciary duty, which directly
contributed to climate destabilization. Appellant Flood has already
experienced property damage, limited access to food, and increased
health risks, R. at 5, in violation of his substantive due process
rights.
Appellants’ claims before this court do not present
nonjusticiable political questions. The federal courts are expressly
authorized to hear cases arising under the Constitution, or those
that involve the U.S. or a foreign citizen as party. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. Congress has also explicitly granted jurisdiction to hear
claims brought by aliens under the ATS. Neither issue before this
court has been constitutionally committed to another branch,
therefore, it is proper for this court to rule on both matters. Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). It is the responsibility of the
Judiciary to interpret ambiguous laws and to resolve claims arising
under the Constitution. Id. at 211. Fulfilling this duty will not
require this court to adhere to any previously made political
declaration, nor will it result in multiple pronouncements made in
violation of the separation of powers. Resolution of these questions
only requires this court to apply normal principles of interpretation
to the contested provisions of law.
Appellants respectfully request that the Twelfth Circuit Court
of Appeals reverse the district court’s decision and remand for
further proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The U.S. District Court for New Union Island erred as a
matter of law when it dismissed Appellants’ Complaint. Thus, this
court should review the decision de novo. See Howard v. Office of
the Chief Admin. Officer of the U.S. House of Representatives, 720
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F.3d 939, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Because this case comes to us on
an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the District Court
decision de novo.”). The district court’s legal determinations are
entitled to little or no deference. Id.

ARGUMENT
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE ENABLES “ALIEN” 1
VICTIMS TO BRING SUITS AGAINST DOMESTIC
CORPORATE PERSONS.
A. Traditional Principles of Statutory Interpretation
Preclude a Categorical Exemption for Domestic
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute.
In place for nearly 230 years, the Alien Tort Statute grants
U.S. courts the jurisdiction to hear cases and award damages to
aliens who are victims of violations of customary international law.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.2 The District Court for New Union Island
incorrectly held that the ATS forecloses claims against domestic
corporations. R. at 11. The Statute contains no exclusionary
language such that allowing claims against corporations would
contravene the plain meaning. The relevant history surrounding
the ATS’s enactment reinforces the notion that liability is
permitted.
1. The Plain Language of the ATS is Unambiguous and
Contains No Exclusionary Provision Limiting Who
May be Held Accountable to Alien Victims for
Violations of the Law of Nations.
Under traditional canons of statutory interpretation, analysis
begins first and foremost with the plain language of the statute. If
the language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry ceases. Rubin v.
1 As used herein, alien refers to “[a]ny person not a citizen or national of the
United States.” Definition of Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/data-standards-anddefinitions/definition-terms (last visited Sept. 1, 2018).
2 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
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United States, 449 U.S. 424, 420 (1981); see Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“When ‘the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts’—at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—’is to
enforce it according to its terms.’”). In Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co v. Union Planters Bank, the Supreme Court was tasked with
evaluating whether a provision of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code3 allowed administrative claimants. Id. at 14. In concluding
the language excluded certain claimants, the Court considered
several factors. Id. at 6. First, when the statute “‘names the parties
granted the right to invoke its provision, such parties only may
act.’” Id. at 7 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (5th ed. 1992)). Second, the Court
considered whether the exclusionary language of the party granted
the right “is the most obvious party who would have been thought
empowered to use the provision.” Id.
Applying the logic of Hartford to the present case, it would be
improper to conclude that the ATS permits non-aliens to bring
claims when the language clearly names the party entitled the
right to invoke its provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Another clear
example is the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), oft-cited
alongside the ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). The TVPA states: “An
individual who . . . subjects an individual to torture shall . . . be
liable for damages to that individual.” Id. (emphasis added). The
TVPA expressly prescribes who may be a claimant and who may
be held liable: individuals. Id. Consequently, the language of the
TVPA excludes corporate claimants and corporate liability. Id.
Unlike the statute in Hartford and the TVPA, the ATS contains no
exclusionary language preventing liability for certain parties.
2. Historical Materials Surrounding the Statute’s
Enactment Reinforce the Notion that Domestic
Corporations Should be Held Liable.
An examination of the legislative history of the ATS underpins
the Statute’s plain language, and suggests that domestic corporate
3 “The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim
the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such
property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claims.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(c) (2018) (emphasis added).
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persons are subject to liability. In its first session, the First
Congress of the United States—with little instruction from the
Constitution on the structure of the Judicial Branch—set out to
write a federal statute developing the Judiciary’s framework. See
JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., RL32118, THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE: LEGIS. HIST. AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 4
(2003). In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act, which included
the ATS. See id. The First Congress enacted the ATS as a
jurisdictional statute, with the understanding that the district
courts “would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in
violation of the law of nations . . . .” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. When
the ATS was drafted, the law of nations was generally comprised
of two varieties: first, general norms governing behavior between
nation-states, and second, where the “rules binding individuals for
the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the norms of state
relationships.” Id. at 714.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government
lacked the authority to prevent or remedy these violations of the
law of nations, so Congress called upon the states to vindicate
these rights and punish individuals for breaches of treaties and
conventions to which the U.S. was a party. Id. at 716. In its
Framer-era form, the ATS “enabled the United States to avoid
responsibility for law of nations violations by permitting aliens to
sue US citizens for intentional torts in federal court.” Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law
of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 454 (2011) [hereinafter Bellia].
This commitment to enforce the law of nations on a domestic level
was apparent and exemplified by the drafters of the ATS with its
reference to torts. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 716. Without this statute
in place, the United States would have been vulnerable to war
initiated by the victim’s nation. Bellia, at 454.
3. Domestic Corporate Immunity Under the ATS Leads to
Absurd and Unjust Results.
An essential canon of statutory interpretation is the principle
of reduction ad absurdum (to avoid absurd results). See United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 56 (1994) (opting to follow a
“sensible construction” of a statute that avoids reaching an absurd
outcome). Domestic corporate immunity under the ATS is simply

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/3

10

2019]

BEST BRIEF OVERALL

61

incompatible with its purpose. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,
427 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should avoid construing
the statute in a way that produces . . . absurd results.”). The
Supreme Court has held that an “aggregate corporation, at
common law, is a collection of individuals, united into one collective
body, under a special name . . . possess[ing] the capacity . . . of
suing and being sued.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518, 667 (1819). The Court acknowledged that these entities
exist and act in the same manner in every country. Id. at 668. The
concept of a corporate entity is embedded in federal and state law,
allowing a corporation to act as an individual exercising rights and
responsibilities through the use of its natural members as its
agents. It is a common understanding that a corporation is a
juridical person with the capacity to be sued. See Cook Cty. v.
United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2003).
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co, the Second Circuit held
that corporate liability was not recognized under the law of
nations. 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). The majority suggested
that, by merely operating in corporate form, “commercial
exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can
successfully shield those profits from victims’ claims for
compensation . . . .” Id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). As Judge
Leval indicated, “[t]he new rule [of corporate immunity] offers to
unscrupulous businesses advantages of incorporation never before
dreamed of.” Id. Such protection of corporations from civil liability
has absurd results and grave consequences. Id. For example, upon
incorporation, businesses will “be free to trade in or exploit
slaves . . . perform genocides or operate torture prisons . . . or
engage in piracy” without civil ramifications. Id. Under the
majority’s wisdom, “such an enterprise could have hired itself out
to operate Nazi extermination camps . . . immune from civil
liability to its victims.” Id. The corporate shield validated by the
majority in Kiobel is not only antithetical to fundamental human
rights, but it also violates the ATS’s plain language and the history
surrounding its enactment.
Although the issue of corporate liability under the ATS was
the question the Supreme Court granted for certiorari, the Court
decided the Kiobel appeal on a wholly separate issue:
extraterritoriality. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108,
124 (2013). The uncertainty of corporate liability under the ATS
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was left for future determination. As Justice Breyer made clear in
his concurrence, there exists a “distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of
mankind.” Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring). It is not in our
nation’s interest to allow corporations, like HexonGlobal, to cause
harm, free of consequences. See id. at 135 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
B. The Supreme Court’s Recent Holding in Jesner v.
Arab Bank Does Not Shield Domestic Corporations
from Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.
In 2018, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether
corporations could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute. Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018). The Court declined
to answer the broad question of corporate liability, and narrowly
held that foreign corporations were precluded from liability. Id.
The decision to exclude foreign corporations from the reach of the
ATS hinged on the Court’s incapacity to render the necessary
policy judgments that are implicated under foreign corporate
liability. Id. at 1403 (“The political branches, not the Judiciary,
have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreignpolicy concerns.”). This analysis is not dispositive for domestic
corporate liability.
Prior to the Court’s decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,
there was a four-to-one federal circuit courts split, with the
majority endorsing a theory of corporate liability under the ATS.
See Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2014)
(permitting a lawsuit against a U.S. corporate defendant for aiding
and abetting child slavery); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654
F.3d 11, 54–57 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to follow the Second
Circuit’s judgment in Kiobel that the ATS precludes corporate
liability), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir.
2013); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021
(7th Cir. 2011) (noting “corporate liability is possible under the
[ATS]”); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2009) (“The modern line of ATS cases initially involved state
actors violating the law of nations, but subsequent cases have
expanded the scope of the ATS to impose liability on . . .
corporations.”); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315
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(11th Cir. 2008) (considering the text of the ATS and noting that
no provision expressly exempts corporations from liability under
the statute).
Since the Court’s decision in Jesner—which explicitly excluded
foreign corporate liability but impliedly authorized domestic
corporate liability—courts that have confronted the question of the
latter have correctly interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion to
permit such liability. See Doe v. Nestle, USA, 906 F.3d 1120, 1124
(9th Cir. 2018) (noting “Jesner did not eliminate all corporate
liability under the ATS”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
320 F. Supp. 3d 781, 787 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2018) (“Jesner’s careful
limiting of the analysis and holding suggests to this court that the
Jesner Court did not intend to disturb this status quo with respect
to domestic corporations.”). The decision in Jesner should not be
applied expansively to foreclose domestic corporate liability under
the Statute, since the Court’s holding was narrow, immunizing
only foreign corporations.
II. THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE IS A CUSTOMARY
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEABLE
AS THE “LAW OF NATIONS” UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE.
Under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), district courts have
jurisdiction over tort actions brought by aliens alleging a violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350. What constitutes the “law of nations” has not been specified
by statute, but has been exemplified through standards
established by precedential cases and international sources. The
principle derived from the Trail Smelter Arbitration is embedded
as customary international law through international agreements,
declarations, and practices of civilized nations. See infra Section
II.B. The decision clearly expressed that, “a State owes at all times
a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals
from within its jurisdiction.” Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A.
at 1963. The degree of specificity to which this Principle has been
defined and the level of acceptance by the States of the world has
established it as international law enforceable as the law of
nations.
A. Trail Smelter Relied on State Sovereignty and
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Territorial Integrity in Defining the Rule Against
Transboundary Harm.
State sovereignty is understood as one of the most basic
principles of international law. See U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 1 (The
United Nations is “based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members.”). This right extends to resource management
within a State’s territory, as reflected in the principle of
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources declared by the
United Nations (U.N.). G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962).
Sovereignty allows a State to exploit their own resources and
choose “what the land and air within will have happen to them.”
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965.
Coupled with the right to sovereignty and discretion to use
one’s own resources is the concept of territorial integrity.
Territorial integrity obliges States to respect the sovereignty, and
therefore the encompassing territory, of other States while
carrying on activities which exploit resources within their own
boundaries. See Islands of Palmas Case, (Neth v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A.
829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). While prevention of transboundary
harm is the central obligation imposed in Trail Smelter, R. at 8,
this principle has also been declared by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) as an obligation common in the international scheme.
See The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J.
4, 22 (Apr. 9) (stating every “State’s obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States” as a general and well-recognized principle). In
consideration of sovereignty, it is a reasonable demand that
activities outside of a State’s control do not damage resources or
property within the State’s territory. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3
R.I.A.A. at 1965. Accordingly, it is rational to require corporations
and States, such as HexonGlobal and the U.S., to refrain from
knowingly harming low-lying islands outside of their territory,
such as A’na Atu. R. at 5–6.
B. States Adopt the Trail Smelter Principle as a
Universal Norm Governing the Rights and Duties
to Each Other Based on Explicit and Accepted
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Obligations.
Customary international law is composed of those rules that
States consistently abide by, or accede to, due to legal obligations
and mutual concern. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233,
248 (2nd Cir. 2003); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAWS OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). The
Supreme Court requires any claim based on customary
international law—or the present day “law of nations”—to be
specific, universal, and obligatory so as to govern the behavior
among States, including the duties corresponding to their rights as
sovereign States. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714, 732.
1. The Trail Smelter Principle Has Repeatedly Been
Specified in Various Forms by the Most
Distinguished Bodies of International Law.
The Trail Smelter Tribunal was clear in its ruling: “under the
principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury . . . in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein . . . .” Trail
Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. The arbitral decision was
not the first, nor the last place to explicitly recognize this principle,
expressed as sic utere (use your own property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another). See Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S.
86, 89 (1890) (“Sic utere . . . is a maxim of universal application.”).
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), it was reiterated that States have the
sovereign right to “exploit their own resources” and a
“responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States.”
UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 166. As a ratified treaty, the
UNFCCC’s legal status is equivalent to federal legislation. See
infra Section IV. This rule against transboundary harm was also
explicitly embodied in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration, U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions, and by the behavior practiced among and across
nations. See U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., Rio Declaration
on
Environment
and
Development,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992); U.N.
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Conference on Env’t and Dev., Stockholm Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1
(June 1972); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962). The
consistent, specific articulation of this principle is the resultant
choice of the international community defining their interactions
with each other. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“[W]e now tend to
understand common law not as a discoverable reflection of
universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of human
choice.”).
2. The Trail Smelter Principle is so Widely Practiced and
Accepted by the Nations of the World That it is a
Universal Norm.
Although the Trail Smelter decision was only binding upon the
United States and Canada, the underlying principle has been
reiterated, validated, and adopted on a universal basis. In addition
to the international bodies that specifically convey this principle,
virtually all nations abide by and adopt it. Universal acceptance
and usage allow practices to ripen into rules of international law.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1899). While there is great
weight in finding the provision in multiple sources as proof of
universality, there is also significant value in the number and
influence of States who adopt the provision and act in accordance
with its fundamental principles. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138.
The greatest example of universality in the modern world of
international relations is the United Nations. Membership is open
to all States accepting the principles contained in the U.N.
Charter, and by receiving the rights and benefits of membership,
they agree to fulfill their assumed obligations in good faith. U.N.
Charter art. 4 ¶ 1, art. 2 ¶ 2. Additionally, Members are to ensure
non-member States act in accordance with these principles to
maintain international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶
6. Determining a rule is one of customary international law would
mean the rule applies to nations who have not formally ratified it.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138. Of the 196 States in the world, 193 are
U.N. Members, and the remaining three (Kosovo, the Vatican City,
and Palestine) are non-member observers. Non-member States,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/memberstates/non-member-states/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2018).
The high level of membership is not only significant in showing
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broad acceptance of the United Nations’ commitments and
standards, but also lends support to universal adherence to the
declarations of the international body. Members do not sit by idly—
they actively participate in the creation of agreements and
resolutions that embody principles collectively practiced by the
nations of the world. The United Nations has adopted the Principle
upheld in Trail Smelter, see infra Section II.B.1, and the nations of
the world have universally agreed to abide by this Principle,
embracing it as an international norm to be followed by all.
3. The Restriction on Transboundary Harm is Obligatory
Because its Application Imposes the Rights
Subsisting Between Nations and Operates as Law.
The Supreme Court is of the opinion that declarations alone
are simply statements of principles setting up a common “standard
of achievement” for all nations, and would not qualify as a treaty
or agreement imposing legal obligations. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734.
When a customary international law is established, this norm
“teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the
obligations corresponding to those rights,” and “prescribes the
duties of nations, in their intercourse with each other.” Sosa, 542
U.S. at 714 (second emphasis added) (first quoting E. DE VATTEL,
LAW OF NATIONS 67 (1797); and then quoting 1 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1). The obligation does not
necessarily stem from the source of the principle, but rather
derives from usage by civilized nations. This aligns with the
Supreme Court’s historical approach—applying international law
where there is no treaty or controlling act and enforcing it with the
same authority as domestic laws. See The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. at 700 (affirming the administration of international law);
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (stating the laws of the United States
recognize the law of nations and will apply international law when
appropriate).
III. THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE, ACCEPTED AS
THE LAW OF NATIONS, IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ACTORS BECAUSE THEY ARE JURIDICAL PERSONS
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SUBJECT TO LIABILITY.
A. The Court Overlooks the Distinction Between
Customary International Norms Enforceable as
the Law of Nations and the Liability Imposed by
Domestic Law.
By following the Second Circuit in Kiobel, R. at 9, the District
Court for New Union Island overlooked the key distinction between
international norms of conduct and the actual remedies provided
by federal courts. See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 50. Although it was
acknowledged that “international law, of its own force, imposes no
liabilities on corporations or other private juridical entities,” the
Kiobel court also recognized that corporate liability for a violation
of international law is an issue left to the individual nation who
will be imposing civil liability. 621 F.3d at 121. The Jesner Court
also followed Kiobel when deciding a foreign corporation would not
be held liable under the ATS because corporate liability was not
found to be an international norm so specific, universal, and
obligatory to be considered the law of nations. 138 S. Ct. at 1401.
While the courts in Jesner and Kiobel may not have held corporate
liability to be a custom enforceable as the law of nations, the
international norm being applied is not one of corporate liability.
The international law violated is that expressed by the Trail
Smelter Principle, but the violation is being brought before a U.S.
federal court, not an international court of justice. The remedies
available in federal courts arise under those laws that will be
binding on the parties before the court—this includes international
norms constituting the law of nations, but where no international
law controls, federal laws must be applied. See The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. This reflects the presumption that
United States law governs domestically, but does not rule the
world. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115.
When originally enforced, Trail Smelter imposed obligations
against a non-governmental actor based on the fact that this
corporation would be held liable by a decision of a U.S. court. Trail
Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1966. The Trail Smelter
Principle not only reflects the international norm that “no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury. . . in or to the territory of another
[State] or the properties or persons therein . . .” but also reflects
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the same norm adopted by the United States. Id. at 1965; see
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907) (“[I]t is
a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted . . . and whatever
domestic destruction they may have suffered, should not be further
destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its
control . . . .”). While Canada was party to the arbitration, the
obligations and alterations were enforced against the company
responsible for the damage. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A.
at 1966. HexonGlobal is the domestic corporation bearing
responsibility for nearly a third of all U.S. GHG emissions, which
have largely contributed to Mana’s climate change induced
damages. R. at 5.
B. International Law Recognizes the Individual
Liability of Non-Governmental Actors.
Although the remedy lies in the hands of federal courts, rather
than international norms, it is nevertheless true that international
law does not provide for corporate immunity, and has held nongovernmental actors responsible for violations of the law of
nations. The Nuremberg Tribunals are oft-cited as an
authoritative source of customary international law. See G.A. Res.
95 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946). The Tribunal specifically recognized
individual liability while stating “international law imposes duties
and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states” and
“individuals can be punished for violations of international law.”
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126 (quoting The Nurnberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D.
69, 110 (Int’l Mil. Trib. at Nuremberg 1946)).
While the Tribunal itself is authoritative on international law,
the principles it enforces stem from developed national laws,
considering that international law comes into existence by
widespread application and acceptance of such laws. See BIN
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 24 (2006). International
law draws from domestic laws because they are generally more
developed and “for the good reason that a principle which is found
to be generally accepted by civilized legal systems may fairly be
assumed to be so reasonable” as to be applicable to all just legal
systems. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62–63 (6th ed. 1963).
General principles of international law—derived from domestic
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laws and applied to non-governmental actors—lend support to the
principle practiced by the United States, see Section I.A.2., and
other nations, that corporations can be held liable for their actions.
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 54. It is recognized in legal systems
throughout the world that corporate responsibility is part of the
privilege of legal personhood. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 n.20 (1983).
IV. THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE IS NOT
DISPLACED BY THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAUSE IT DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH THE ACT AND THE PRINCIPLE IS
EMBODIED IN A SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED U.S.
TREATY.
A. In the United States, Ratified Treaties are the
Supreme Law of the Land.
The Supremacy Clause4 ranks the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Federal law and
formalized treaties are equally elevated to this status, so long as
they are not in conflict with—or “displaced” by—the Constitution.
Id.; see Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the
Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
like obligation, with an act of legislation.”); see also SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006). The power to enter
into treaties is conferred in Article II of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In the U.S., a treaty enters into full force
of law, “when the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, has ratified it or otherwise given official notification of
consent to be bound, provided the agreement is also in force
internationally.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S., Td No. 2 § 104 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
B. When a Ratified Treaty and Federal Law are Not in
Conflict, They Ought to be Construed so as to
4 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
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Effectuate Both.
It is well established that federal law and treaties have the
effect of preempting conflicting state law. When a federal law and
a ratified treaty broach the same subject but can coexist, since both
are declared by the Constitution as supreme law, “the courts will
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if
that can be done without violating the language of either.”
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
1. The Trail Smelter Principle Has Been Incorporated
into a Treaty Ratified by the United States.
The Trail Smelter Principle, discussed at length in Section II,
has been embodied by numerous international agreements and
treaties ratified by the U.S. For example, the Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) was adopted in 1979,
signed and ratified by the U.S. in 1981, and went into force in 1983.
LRTAP,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mt
dsg_no=XXVII- 1&chapter=27&clang=_en. The agreement aims to
limit and “gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including
long-range transboundary air pollution.” LRTAP, Nov. 13, 1979,
1302 U.N.T.S. 217, 220. The Trail Smelter Principle is
incorporated in LRTAP’s Preamble.5 Id. at 219. As a ratified, selfexecuting treaty, LRTAP remains the supreme law of the land,
unless in conflict with constitutional provisions, or followed by
inconsistent federal legislation.
Roughly a decade after LRTAP went into effect, the U.S.
reaffirmed its recognition of the Trail Smelter Principle as
domestic law. See R. at 6. In 1992, then-President George H.W.
Bush, upon advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Id. The UNFCCC recognized the impact of anthropogenic GHG
emissions on destabilizing the climate system and entrusted
5 “States have, in accordance with . . . the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . .”
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developed nations with adopting mitigation policies commensurate
with their GHG emissions. See UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169.
Just as the LRTAP, the UNFCCC’s Preamble6 articulates the Trail
Smelter Principle and its prohibition of transboundary harm. Id.
at 166. The UNFCCC remains a ratified treaty in the United
States. Thus, it is entitled to constitutional supremacy. U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
2. Treaties Embodying the Trail Smelter Principle Do Not
Conflict with the Clean Air Act’s Regulation of
Greenhouse Gases.
The Trail Smelter Principle is not at odds with section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018), and
both should operate with the full force of law. The Principle, as
articulated in the arbitration between the U.S. and Canada,
focuses on territorial infringement by one State of another State
through environmental pollution. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3
R.I.A.A. at 1966. The notion that one may not conduct itself in such
a way that imposes harm across national boundaries can coexist
with the CAA’s regulation of greenhouse gases. In fact, courts
should seek to enforce both the federal law and the treaty when
possible. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
C. Even If the Trail Smelter Principle Conflicts with
the Clean Air Act, the UNFCCC Displaces the
Federal Legislation Because It Went into Effect
Most Recently.
When federal law and a ratified treaty are inconsistent “the
one last in date will control the other . . . .” Whitney, 124 U.S. at
194; see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); see also
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (2002) (“When properly approved and
ratified, [a treaty’s] substantive provisions can both preempt
conflicting state law and even displace earlier federal statutes.”)
6 “States have, in accordance with . . . the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . .”
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(emphasis added). Even if the Preambles of the LRTAP and
UNFCCC, which contain the Trail Smelter Principle, conflict with
the Clean Air Act’s regulation of greenhouse gases, the UNFCCC
went into full force subsequent to the enactment of the CAA and
its most recent amendments. Thus, the treaty displaces the federal
statute. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
In 1958, scientists began regularly recording measurements of
CO2 in the atmosphere at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.
Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/full.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2018). The first recording indicated a mean of 315.97 parts
per million. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Clean Air Act of 1963 was
enacted as the first federal legislation to authorize “the
development of a national program to address air pollution related
environmental problems.” Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-airact (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Evolution of the CAA].
Since its enactment, three major amendments to the CAA
have occurred. Id. In 1970, the EPA’s authority to regulate air
pollution expanded with the development of several programs
authorizing the regulation of emissions. Id. “[B]y the time
Congress drafted § 202(a)(1) in 1970, [CO2] levels had reached 325
parts per million.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007).
Most recently, in 1990, the EPA’s authority expanded once again—
this time to include stationary source permitting. See Evolution of
the CAA. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court recognized
the agency’s authority to regulate GHG emissions pursuant to
section 202(a)(1) of the Act. 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). Since the
Court’s decision, the EPA issued new findings and implemented
various regulations pertaining to GHG emissions. See, e.g.,
Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); LightDuty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May
7, 2010). However, these actions by the EPA are enabled through
the 1990 version of the Clean Air Act. Any conflict between
regulations passed pursuant to the 1990 federal legislation and a
U.S. treaty ratified after that time will be supplanted by the treaty.
Therefore, because the UNFCCC was ratified in 1992 and remains
in effect to this day, it displaces any substantive portions of the
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CAA that conflict. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. HexonGlobal’s
failure to comply to the UNFCCC obligations was an act committed
in violation of a binding and enforceable U.S. treaty.
V. THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED ITS PUBLIC TRUST
OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE GLOBAL CLIMATE
ECOSYSTEM, THEREBY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF FLOOD
OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The Public Trust Doctrine, which long predates this nation’s
founding, is the notion that “every sovereign government holds
vital natural resources in ‘trust’ for the public—present and future
generations of citizen beneficiaries.” Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I):
Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL.
L. 43 (2009) [hereinafter Wood]. As early as sixth century Rome’s
Institutes of Justinian, the doctrine of res communis was
understood to include “air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the seashore.” THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 35 (J.B.
Moyle ed., trans., 4th ed. 1906). The roots of the doctrine
permeated English common law, and in 1882, the doctrine was first
articulated in a U.S. court decision. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,
71 (1821). The New Jersey Supreme Court identified “air” among
the natural resources entitled to all. Id. The increasing
temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and rising sea levels are,
by natural law, aspects of the global climate system entitled to all.
R. at 4.
A. Under the Public Trust Doctrine, The United States
Serves as Fiduciary to the Trust and, Thus, Must
Protect Property Held Therein.
The Public Trust Doctrine, like a private trust, includes three
primary elements:
(1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of another; (2) a
beneficiary, to whom the trustee owes equitable duties to deal with
the trust property for his benefit; [and] (3) trust property, which is
held by the trustee for the beneficiary.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.
1959). As applied to natural resources, the doctrine obligates a
trustee to uphold its fiduciary duty “to protect the trust property
against damage or destruction.” GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL.,
BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2016). In essence, the
doctrine demands of the trustee environmental stewardship to
sustain benefits of the trust intergenerationally.
A trustee’s duty of protection requires action. DOUGLAS
QUIRKE, ENVTL. AND NAT. RES. LAW CTR., THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE: A PRIMER 13 (2016) [hereinafter QUIRKE]. As the
Supreme Court noted in Geer v. Connecticut, “it is the duty of the
legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of
the trust . . . .” 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896), overruled on other
grounds, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Thus,
taking a passive role or failing to act when necessary constitutes a
breach of fiduciary duty. QUIRKE, at 13. Importantly, a trustee
owes a duty “to restore the trust if it is damaged due to a breach . . .
or third-party damage.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). A procedural
component of this obligation is that a trustee furnishes adequate
information and knowledge to perform duties competently. Id. at
13. The trustee’s obligations are unalterable and enduring, “and
can only be destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign.” United
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
B. The United States Breached its Fiduciary Duty to
the Public Trust When It Failed to Adequately
Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Supported the Fossil Fuel Industry through
Federal Policies and Subsidies.
A solemn report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), a body of the United Nations which is
comprised of the globe’s leading climate scientists, indicates the
world and its inhabitants have limited time to act in order to halt
the dire impacts of climate change. IPCC Synthesis Report, at 8.
Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further
warming and long- lasting changes in all components of the
climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and
irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate
change would require substantial and sustained reductions in
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greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can
limit climate change risks.

Id. The numerous reports released by the IPCC since its founding
in 1988 make evident that sweeping and concerted action must
occur if climate catastrophe is to be avoided. Id. It is clear that a
“tipping point” is in sight, one in which anthropogenic climate
change will set the planet on a path of no return. See Wood, at 50.
Climate change science has been widely accessible for decades, and
the United States government—as trustee to the public trust
within its sovereign state—cannot claim guiltlessness on the basis
of ignorance. See R. at 6.
Despite the overwhelming evidence of the correlation between
GHG emissions and climate change, the U.S. government remains
instrumental in fossil fuel dependency. R. at 6. Federal legislation
has enabled agencies to regulate the depletion and destruction of
numerous natural resources through permitting programs.
QUIRKE, at 16–17. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) permits water pollution through the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and air
pollution through the New Source Review (NSR). See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 122 (2014); 40 C.F.R. § 51.307 (2014). These permitting
programs, however, do not sufficiently prevent impairment of
natural resources held in the public trust. “When granting a
permit, federal law essentially shields damaging activities from
liability, regardless of how devastating the consequences to trust
resources.” QUIRKE, at 16–17. Such actions are antithetical to the
longevity of natural resources and the trust’s future beneficiaries.
Aside from regulatory permitting, the federal government has
supported and continues to support the exploration, extraction,
and combustion of fossil fuels through subsidies. See Mona Hymel,
The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives:
The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 47 (2006) [hereinafter Hymel, Tax Incentives].
For more than a century, the U.S. “has added and expanded tax
incentives for fossil fuel energy.” Mona L. Hymel, Environmental
Tax Policy and the United States: A “Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 159 (2013). The U.S. is inextricably linked
to the oil, gas, and coal industries, providing in excess of $370
billion in tax breaks over the past century. Hymel, Tax Incentives,
at 71. Each year, the U.S. government provides an estimated $14.7
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billion in federal subsidies. REDMAN ET AL., OIL CHANGE INT’L,
DIRTY ENERGY DOMINANCE: DEPENDENT ON DENIAL: HOW THE
U.S. FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON SUBSIDIES AND CLIMATE
DENIAL 5 (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter REDMAN]. Under the Trump
Administration alone, royalty rates have decreased for drilling in
offshore waters, the Department of the Interior (DOI) discontinued
ongoing review of royalty rates for coal extracted from public lands,
and the DOI increased the budget by $10 million for the Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, encouraging
offshore oil and gas drilling. REDMAN, at 14. The federal
government’s persistent support of third- party fossil fuel
companies, R. at 6, despite the recognized impact of fossil fuel
dependency, renders the U.S. complicit in natural resource
degradation, in violation of their role as trustee.
C. The United States Violated Appellant Flood’s Due
Process Rights When It Breached its Fiduciary
Duty as Trustee to the Public Trust, Which
Contributed to Destabilizing the Climate System.
The U.S. government is proscribed from depriving persons “of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The federal government, in violation of its
fiduciary duties to the public trust, has actively contributed to
GHG emissions reaching dangerous levels through pollution
permitting and fossil fuel subsidies. See infra Section V.B.
Consequently, U.S. actions were integral in destabilizing the
climate system. R. at 6. In Juliana v. United States, a case on point,
Judge Aiken correctly concluded, “the right to a climate system
capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and
ordered society.” 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). Without
a stable climate system, civilization would be nonexistent. Id.
The changing climate has already impacted Flood. R. at 5. He
has incurred financial loss associated with seawater damage to his
home—damage that would not have occurred but for the GHGinduced sea level rise. R. at 5. Flood is at increased risk of heat
stroke and mosquito-borne diseases because of higher
temperatures. R. at 5. Ocean acidification, global warming, and
loss of coastal wetlands will soon reduce Flood’s access to local
seafood, which he heavily relies on. R. at 5. The parties do not
dispute that limits on fossil fuel production and combustion would
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reduce further property damage, lessen the health risks associated
with increased temperatures, and maintain the habitability of
Flood’s community. R. at 5. Since a stable climate is a necessary
condition to existing fundamental rights, including life, liberty,
and property, the federal government’s role in anthropogenic GHG
emissions violates Flood’s due process rights.
VI. APPELLANTS’ ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND PUBLIC
TRUST CLAIMS DO NOT PRESENT POLITICAL
QUESTIONS AND ARE PROPER FOR ADJUDICATION
CONSIDERING THE ABSENCE OF ALL OF THE BAKER
FACTORS.
Federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate a case or
controversy capable of resolution through the judicial process.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516. Courts are unable to revise
implemented policies or entertain issues otherwise entrusted to
Congress or the Executive Branch. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
277 (2004). This restriction against deciding “political questions”
does not prevent federal courts from creating resolutions which
will remedy violations of rights or interpret statutes to enforce
previously authorized actions. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1270;
see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 530–35 (explaining the EPA’s
duties cannot be ignored because the consequences touch on
obligations of other agencies, nor does the subject preclude the
Court from enforcing obligations). A nonjusticiable political
question would be present if any of the factors identified in Baker
v. Carr7 were reflected in the dispute. 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
Neither claim presently before the court demonstrate these factors,
therefore both are proper for judicial resolution.

7 Factors include: “[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
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A. Resolution of the Alien Tort Statute Claim and
Public Trust Claim Have Been Designated to the
Judiciary through Constitutional Commitment,
Express Statutory Language, and a Lack of
Assignment to Other Political Branches.
The political question doctrine prevents federal courts from
deciding cases where there is a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. The duty to resolve the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) and public trust claims have been designated
to the Judicial Branch—rather than the Executive or Legislative
Branch—by various sources. The Constitution expressly gives
judicial power to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, including controversies to which the United
States shall be a party, such as the public trust claim, and where
the dispute involves citizens of foreign States, such as the ATS
claim. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Furthermore, the public trust
claim arises under the Constitution by its origination in the Due
Process Clause, imposed to prevent the government from abusing
its power. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). The duty
to interpret such cases is committed by the Constitution to the
Judicial Branch alone.
Express statutory language and established case law have also
provided the Judiciary with control over such matters. The
language of the ATS specifically provides jurisdiction over civil
actions brought by aliens. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). While foreign
policy power is delegated to the President, it would be erroneous to
assume any case touching foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance. Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 873 (N.D. Ca. 2009). Presupposing such is outside of
the Judiciary’s power would defeat the purpose of statutes like the
ATS or others similarly rooted in areas generally designated to the
Executive or Legislative branches, and would turn any challenge
into a political question. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941
(1983). Additionally, the Judicial Branch has resolved issues
regarding property held in public trust since the United States
came into existence. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574
(1823) (clarifying that the United States’ exclusive ownership of all
lands within it was established by discovery and conquest).
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Resolving public trust questions is a familiar practice for the
courts. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469
(1988).
Further evidence of the judicial power to resolve this issue is
presented by a lack of constitutional commitment of the issue to
any other branch. The political question doctrine prevents the
courts from intruding on policy choices and judgments of Congress
or the President. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th
Cir. 1992). Here, there is no express provision of the Constitution
granting power over these matters—a tort claim brought against a
domestic corporation by an alien and a public trust claim brought
against the United States by its own citizen—to either of the other
branches. On the contrary, the final determination of such
controversies rests solely with the Judiciary, as expressed by the
Constitution, the statutes constructed by Congress, and precedent
case law surrounding the claims.
B. Analysis of Both Claims are Within the Judiciary’s
Legal Expertise and Ability to Discover
Manageable Standards Necessary for Resolution
Rather than Requiring the Court to Determine
New Policies.
The second and third factors presented in Baker8 ask whether
resolution of the question would demand the court to go beyond the
scope of its judicial expertise, in both the ability to declare
judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and under the
condition that claims be resolved without an initial policy
determination. Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
Both claims brought by plaintiffs are capable of resolution without
surpassing judicial limits. Plaintiffs seek a determination of
whether a law has been violated and whether the United States
holds property in public trust—these require interpretation of the
law and the Constitution, and are determinations for which there
are clearly judicially manageable standards. See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
8 “[2] lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion...”
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1. Judicial Resolution Does Not Require Scientific
Certainty and the Court Only Needs to Administer
Broad Obligations to the Extent Necessary for Action.
The question is not whether the case is unmanageable in
terms of its complexity or consequences, but whether courts have
the “legal tools to reach a ruling that is principled, rational, and
based upon reason distinctions.” Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 874. The District Court for New Union Island, in
following Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
incorrectly interpreted what manageable standards entail. 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 874–75. While the court must necessarily balance the
competing interests of the parties, this does not require resolution
of the dispute with the high level of scientific certainty requested
in Kivalina. See id. Manageable standards have been developed in
similar situations, such as in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the
Court simply directed the EPA to look at the available scientific
evidence and adopt standards which would prevent the alleged
violations from causing further harm. 549 U.S. at 519– 20. While
the court should respect an agency’s broad discretion in carrying
out delegated responsibilities, the obligation to carry out those
responsibilities will be enforced where the refusal to act causes
harm. Id. at 534 (“Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by
noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate
change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to
regulate at this time.”). Although the court may be uninterested in
oppressing one party to advance the interests of the other, this is
not necessary. It is possible to analyze and adjust competing
interests in order to allow continuation and prevent damage. See
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1939.
2. Courts are Capable of Resolving Claims Without
Creating New Policies, Particularly When the
Constitution and Statutes Clearly Provide for
Judicial Enforcement.
Federal courts have proven they are capable of crafting
creative results without an initial policy determination. While
courts are unable to adopt a new or better policy, they are able to
enforce policy and address constitutional violations. See
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–35; Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at
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1270. By resolving both the ATS and public trust claims, the court
would not be creating new policies, but simply enforcing those
already established. The ATS provides for resolution of violations
of the law of nations as defined in Section II above. The purpose of
the Statute is to provide a platform for enforcement of
international law violations. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. It is also the
court’s duty to address constitutional violations as they arise. By
resolving the public trust claim, the court is not creating a new
doctrine, but rather protecting the people from obstruction or
interference with property held in public trust, as protected by the
Due Process Clause. See Ill. Cent. R. Co v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
452 (1892).
C. Prudential Considerations of Prior Political
Declarations Cannot Prevent the Court from
Fulfilling its Designated Obligation to Settle
Disputes.
The remaining Baker factors9 prevent the court from ruling on
political questions where resolution would violate the separation
of powers. Such prudential concerns call for mutual respect among
the three branches. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 (1979).
While at first sight these claims seem to invoke the authority of
the other branches, courts have the authority to construe
legislation, executive agreements, treaties, and international laws.
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986) (“it goes without saying that interpreting congressional
legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts”).
Questions may arise in areas where the court would gladly avoid
them, but the court cannot avoid such questions where it is their
duty to address them. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
The claims presently before the court are purely legal
questions. While there is an interplay between foreign relations
and domestic regulations, it is the Judiciary’s role to interpret
statutes and the Constitution, and this responsibility cannot be
9 “[4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
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avoided merely because the decisions may have political overtones.
Id.; Powell, 395 U.S. at 548–49. This responsibility does not show
a lack of respect due a coordinate branch of government, but rather
emphasizes the role of the Judicial Branch. Congress or the
President cannot determine the applicability of an unclear statute
or interpret the Constitution—this decision is left to the courts.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012). Our federal system
may require courts to interpret the Constitution and statutes in a
“manner at variance with the construction given the document by
another branch.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 549. But, resolution of these
claims will not result in “multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question,” for it is the responsibility of the
courts to act as the ultimate interpreter of such claims arising
under the Constitution. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. Additionally, these
claims are presently before the court because there have not been
declarations by any other branch which provide enough specificity
to resolve the issues.
Resolution of these questions may not be easy, but they only
require the court to apply normal principles of interpretation to the
provisions at issue. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548–49. Because the
claims do not raise questions entrusted to one of the other political
branches, nor has a political decision already been made which the
court should adhere to or which would result in multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question, the
court must fulfill its duty to resolve discrepancies in the law.
Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005). It has
long been the responsibility of the Judiciary to resolve difficult
issues of interpretation. Whether such disputes touch on areas of
international law or otherwise impact foreign policy, or in those
decisions which will uphold the constitutional protections afforded
to the people of the United States, so long as prudential concerns
do not disrupt the balance of power between the coordinate
branches of government, the Judicial Branch must carry out its
duty to hold individuals, entities, and the government responsible
for violations of the law.

CONCLUSION
Upon the foregoing, Appellants, Organization of Disappearing
Island Nations, Apa Mana, and Noah Flood, respectfully request
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that this appellate court reverse the district court’s decision and
remand for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of November, 2018,

Attorneys for the Appellants, Organization of Disappearing
Island Nations, Apa Mana, and Noah Flood
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